So much for your assumptions...

[Partha]

Ask Jecks, Patrtha. I am not a mind reader.

Oh, good call, Kulaf!

You mean that evidence that the Special Prosecuter is refusing to turn over to Libby's defense team........that evidence?

Then Partha asked:

You have proof that such evidence is in fact exculpatory? That would be news to the judge, as well.

It may very well be exculpatory if, as Fitz did, the theory of a conspiracy to punish Wilson has been weaved into the indictment. Which it was. Fitz has even woven the conspiracy into Libby's motive, which is nearly per se exculpatory evidence.

It's not quite fair, is it Partha, that Fitz gets to tout Plames alleged classified NOC status with the CIA, and further argue Libby lied to protect his job because he knew it, yet simultaneously argue that Libby doesn't get the evidence to prove or disprove it because it is not relevant.

Do you think that's fair, Partha?

Ask the judge, Chants. I'm sure you have vast amounts more experience going in front of a judge asking to see evidence than I do.

But when you do, one thing to remember....that's NOT the original memo. It's redacted.

Here's the original.

[Trollbait]

Ummm....the memo you linked is redacted, Partha.

[Partha]

There's more taken out of the July 7 one, Jecks. Read closely.

[Trollbait]

Maybe you should read more closely.

The one you linked that you claim is the original is dated July 10 and is to a different person than the July 7 memo.

So how can a memo that came out 3 days later and addressed to a different individual be "the original"?

[Partha]

As the original article tells you, the June 10 memo was the original sent to the Undersecretary. After Wilson's article came out, Ford changed the adressee to Powell and resent on July 7. Note what was taken out when he resent it.

[Chants Evensong]

I have read that memo, too.

There are two interesting things about that memo. One, it is dated June 10, 2003. The other is dated July 7, 2003. I have no idea why.

Two, it contains the INR representitive's notes from the February 19, 2003 meeting. Reading them, it is clear the INR representive was very dismissive about Wilson's trip to Niger. The Embassy had extensive and current contacts and it would be unlikey Joe could find anything. Basically, INR thought the whole trip was a boondoggle.

It is therefor interesting that according to the SSCI report, Joe Wilson's findings were deemed essentially inconclusive by the CIA and were not incorporated into any further intelligence. In short, Joe found nothing that the INR didn't already know. INR, as we recall, voiced its dissenting views clearly, as shown by the declassified NIE report.

Joe had nothing new to say. His trip was a waste of time. The only thing the CIA found useful about his findings was the fact that Iraq had probably sought uranium from Niger in 1999. He misrepresented his findings to the American public and misled them as to the extent to which his findings were incorporated into further intelligence analysis.

Since he joined the Kerry campaign shorthly before Kristof wrote his May 6, 2003 column, I think it should be pretty clear now just who was misrepresenting the intelligence for political gain.

[Chants Evensong]

Thank you for the explanation regarding the different dates Partha. I missed that in the article and it had been nagging me.

[Partha]

It is therefor interesting that according to the SSCI report, Joe Wilson's findings were deemed essentially inconclusive by the CIA and were not incorporated into any further intelligence. In short, Joe found nothing that the INR didn't already know. INR, as we recall, voiced its dissenting views clearly, as shown by the declassified NIE report.

Joe had nothing new to say. His trip was a waste of time. The only thing the CIA found useful about his findings was the fact that Iraq had probably sought uranium from Niger in 1999. He misrepresented his findings to the American public and misled them as to the extent to which his findings were incorporated into further intelligence analysis.

Chants, it's not 'misrepresenting' if the trip that he took reinforced INR's conclusions; it merely means that it did not fit the storyline the Bush administration was feeding the public. If anything, by ignoring it, the CIA (and the administration) 'misrepresented' the available intelligence by taking any reference to INR's dissenting view out of the NIE provided to Congress.

As much as you'd like to paint Joe Wilson as a liar, there is still no evidence that Iraq got any yellowcake from Niger - therefore he was correct in that regard. Trying to paint him as completely dishonest...well, are you trying for a new job?

[Chants Evensong]

Partha asserted:

If anything, by ignoring it, the CIA (and the administration) 'misrepresented' the available intelligence by taking any reference to INR's dissenting view out of the NIE provided to Congress.

Just stop it, Partha. We all know that the INR's dissenting opinion was in fact part of the NIE provided to Congress.

From the NIE "State/INR Alternative View"
http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html

Some of the specialized but dual-use items being sought are, by all indications, bound for Iraq's missile program. Other cases are ambiguous, such as that of a planned magnet-production line whose suitability for centrifuge operations remains unknown. Some efforts involve non-controlled industrial material and equipment -- including a variety of machine tools -- and are troubling because they would help establish the infrastructure for a renewed nuclear program. But such efforts (which began well before the inspectors departed) are not clearly linked to a nuclear end-use. Finally, the claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa are, in INR's assessment, highly dubious.

Joe Wilson's insinuation that it was HIS findings that debunked a Niger/Iraq connection is completely misleading. The INR was already on top of that. Furthermore, his insinuation that his view on the Iraq/Niger connection was ignored is also completely false. That dissenting view was clearly included in the NIE, in its own conspicuous, highlighted box.

[Partha]

Chants, you can stop it. The NIE 'key judgements' from 2002 was not the same as the release from 2003. Don't ask me, ask the Australian parliament.

http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/p ... endixf.pdf

[Chants Evensong]

Partha Noted:

Chants, it's not 'misrepresenting' if the trip that he took reinforced INR's conclusions

The problem, Partha, is that according to the SSCI report, Joe WIlson's actual findings and his findings as he later represented them, differ.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/li ... ter2-b.htm

When the former ambassador spoke to Committee staff, his description of his findings differed from the DO intelligence report [based on his trip to Africa] and his account of information provided to him by the CIA differed from the CIA officials' accounts in some respects. First, the former ambassador described his findings to Committee staff as more directly related to Iraq and, specifically, as refuting both the possibility that Niger could have sold uranium to Iraq and that Iraq approached Niger to purchase uranium. The intelligence report described how the structure of Niger's uranium mines would make it difficult, if not impossible, for Niger to sell uranium to rouge nations, and noted that Nigerien officials denied knowledge of any deals to sell uranium to any rogue states, but did not refute the possibility that Iraq had approached Niger to purchase uranium.

Later in the report it is noted that one of the most valuable aspects of Joe WIlson's findings was that it supported the notion that Iraq was probably seeking uranium from Niger.

He [the reports officer] said he judged that the most important fact in the report [based on Joe WIlson's findings] was that the Nigerien officials admitted that the Iraqi delegation had traveled there in 1999, and that the Nigerien Prime Minister believed the Iraqis were interested in purchasing uranium, because this provided some confirmation of foreign government service reporting

.

Joe WIlson misrepresented his findings, exaggerated his role in intelligence gathering, mistated how extensively his own findings were circulated, and left the false impression that the president ignored the dissenting intelligence.

The fact is is that we don't know exactly what Joe Wilson's findings actually were; we only know what he claims them to be. All indications, however, indicate that the two differ in key areas.

[Chants Evensong]

Partha, you are mizing up apples and oranges.

The classified version containing INR's dissenting opinions you claim did not go to congress, went to congress, was specifically requested by congress, and developed in part for congress.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/li ... ntro-b.htm

(U) In an unclassified letter dated September 9, 2002, Senator Richard Durbin, a member of the SSCI, wrote to the DCI expressing concern that the IC had not drafted an NIE on the status of Iraq's WMD program, and requested that the DCI "direct the production" of such an NIE expressing the belief that "policymakers in both the executive branch and the Congress will benefit from the production of a coordinated, consensus document produced by all relevant components of the Intelligence Community" on this topic. Senator Durbin also requested that the DCI "produce an unclassified summary of this NIE" so "the American public can better understand this important issue."

[Partha]

Ah, now I see your confusion.

(U) On February 26, 2002, the former ambassador arrived in Niger. He told Committee staff that he first met with Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick to discuss his upcoming meetings. Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick asked him not to meet with current Nigerien officials because she believed it might complicate her continuing diplomatic efforts with them on the uranium issue. The former ambassador agreed to restrict his meetings to former officials and the private sector.

( ) The former ambassador told Committee staff that he met with the former Nigerien Prime Minister, the former Minister of Mines and Energy, and other business contacts. At the end of his visit, he debriefed Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick , Chad. He told Committee staff that he had told both U.S. officials he thought there was "nothing to the story." Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick told Committee staff she recalled the former ambassador saying "he had reached the same conclusions that the embassy had reached, that it was highly unlikely that anything was going on."

(U) On March 1, 2002, INR published an intelligence assessment, Niger: Sale of Uranium to Iraq Is Unlikely. The INR analyst who drafted the assessment told Committee staff that he had been told that the piece was in response to interest from the Vice President's office in the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. The assessment reiterated 1NR's view that France controlled the uranium industry and "would take action to block a sale of the kind alleged in a CIA report of questionable credibility from a foreign government service." The assessment added that "some officials may have conspired for individual gain to arrange a uranium sale," but considered President Tandja's government unlikely to risk relations with the U.S. and other key aid donors. In a written response to a question from Committee staff on this matter, the Department of State said the assessment was distributed through the routine distribution process in which intelligence documents are delivered to the White House situation room, but State did not provide the assessment directly to the Vice President in a special delivery.

So, we have Wilson going to Niger, and stating to officials that 'there was nothing going on'.

( ) In early March 2002, the Vice President asked his morning briefer for an update on the Niger uranium issue. In response, on March 5, 2002, WINPAC analysts sent an analytic update to the briefer which noted that the government of Niger said it was making all efforts to ensure that its uranium would be used for only peaceful purposes. The update said the foreign government service that provided the original report "was unable to provide new information, but continues to assess that its source is reliable." The update also noted that the CIA would "be debriefing a source who may have information related to the alleged sale on March 5."

(U) Later that day, two CIA DO officers debriefed the former ambassador who had returned from Niger the previous day. The debriefing took place in the former ambassador's home and although his wife was there, according to the reports officer, she acted as a hostess and did not participate in the debrief. Based on information provided verbally by the former ambassador, the DO case officer wrote a draft intelligence report and sent it to the DO reports officer who added additional relevant information from his notes.

(U) The intelligence report based on the former ambassador's trip was disseminated on March 8, 2002.

(U) In an interview with Committee staff, the former ambassador was able to provide more information about the meeting between former Prime Minister Mayaki and the Iraqi delegation. The former ambassador said that Mayaki did meet with the Iraqi delegation but never discussed what was meant by "expanding commercial relations."The former ambassador said that because Mayaki was wary of discussing any trade issues with a country under United Nations (UN) sanctions, he made a successful effort to steer the conversation away from a discussion of trade with the Iraqi delegation.

( )When the former ambassador spoke to Committee staff, his description of his findings differed from the DO intelligence report and his account of information provided to him by the CIA differed from the CIA officials' accounts in some respects.

So you have taken the obvious tack that Wilson lied to the CIA. It seems more logical, given that the DO officers added 'additional relevant information' to his briefing, that the DO officers instead reported incorrectly. After all, Wilson had a known history as an administration official going all the way back to Bush I, and no red flags were ever raised - however, you had CIA being repeatedly visited by Cheney, Libby, and other administration officials in a way that the Washington Post reported, some analysts felt 'pressured to make their assessments on Iraq fit with Bush Administration policy objectives'.

Further, if you remember your history of the NIE, you'll note that while the NIE was presented to the Select Committee, members of Congress not on the committee may or may not have had security clearances to view the classified NIE - therefore, they could not read the 'classified' INR and see the doubts on the yellowcake issue - they could, and most did, rely on the declassified five page 'Key Judgements', which contained nothing about yellowcake anyways. Members of the Select Committee could not even transmit knowlege of any classified dissent in the document to members who did not have security clearances (much like Rockefeller in the domestic spying case).

You'll remember when refighting THIS battle that Durbin and Graham both repeatedly requested declassification of a larger part of the NIE for the full Congress and that both voted against the war resolution - take from that what you will.

[Chants Evensong]

That was an outstanding post, Partha. Thoughful, logical, and polite. You went to an original source, quoted relevant portions, and weaved them nicely into your argument to rebut some of my key points.

I really like your point on how some members of congress only saw the unclassified portion of the NIE. I think you are correct on that point.

I will be back later to reply to your arguments; I just wanted to take a brief moment to commend you on what struck me as a really good post.

[Partha]

Part of the thing that makes arguing Plamegate/WMD posts is how ultimately confusing a great deal of it is with dates and documents flying. It makes me wonder how a majority of the American public is disapproving of all this with so little of it able to be grasped. Thanks for the kind words, but it wouldn't have happened without quality opposition.

[Trollbait]

"The question is, does Mr. Fitzgerald know who the source was?" Novak asked. "Of course. He's known for years who the first source is. If he knows the source, why didn't he indict him? Because no crime was committed."

Novak said he doesn't believe his source violated laws forbidding the disclosure of a CIA agent's identity.

A spokesman for Fitzgerald declined to comment on Novak's remarks.

http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/cst ... vak20.html

[Partha]

Fitzgerald, again thinks otherwise:

Without the truth, our criminal justice system cannot serve our nation or its citizens. The requirement to tell the truth applies equally to all citizens, including persons who hold high positions in government. In an investigation concerning the compromise of a CIA officer's identity, it is especially important that grand jurors learn what really happened. The indictment returned today alleges that the efforts of the grand jury to investigate such a leak were obstructed when Mr. Libby lied about how and when he learned and subsequently disclosed classified information about Valerie Wilson.

[Kulaf]

So do the guys trying people at Gitmo......but you can Klast are in here all the time harping about how they are being denied access to evidence.

Funny that.

[Partha]

A federal judge has ruled that he's not entitled to that 'evidence', because it's not germane to the defense. That's at least one step better than most of the Gitmo defendents - he's had a day in court.

[Trollbait]

Sorry to dredge up an old thread but I found this interesting.

http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/12/ ... index.html

Armitage said he had seen a memo that said Plame was publicly chairing a meeting, so he assumed her CIA employment was not a secret.

"There was no ill intent on my part, and I had never seen, ever in 43 years of having a security clearance, a covert operative's name in a memo," he said.