TSA Epic Fails

[Ddrak]

I don't know if this kind of anaysis is really going to get very fair. This boils down to how much do you pay to potentially save peoples lives. Medicaid has around the same budget as DHS......should we apply the same kind of analysis there?

Absolutely. At some point you need to put a dollar value on life when you're talking about saving them, because without that you're committing infinite revenues.

Dd

[Ddrak]

DHS invests in snow cone machines:

link

According to the Daily News, that document (which sadly was not available online) says the machines would be used to "make ice to prevent heat-related illnesses during emergencies, treat injuries and provide snow cones as an outreach at promotional events."

It's ok though, because apparently a popcorn machine was turned down.

Dd

[Ddrak]

TSA confiscates cupcakes - frosting is "gel-like":

link

Dd

[Ddrak]

TSA posts their top 10 catches of 2011.

List contains zero terrorists, and anything actually dangerous would have been picked up by the screeners prior to 9/11. Happy your 1.5 billion was wisely spent this year?

Dd

[Torakus]

So I decided that I could not continue to preach to folks about not being part of the solution to problems and not do it myself.

I am giving up my comfortable defense contracting job and joining the DHS/TSA team to fix these problems.

Wish me luck.

[Ddrak]

Good luck - may the system not consume you.

Dd

[Ddrak]

Another one - DHS deports kids after misunderstanding tweet slang:

http://www.businessinsider.com/leigh-br ... roe-2012-1

Dd

[Partha]

I blame Torakus.

[Torakus]

I blame Torakus.

Guilty as charged.

I will quote my son, "TSA you mad! Get gooder."

I have no fucking idea what any of it means.

Tora

[Ddrak]

More criticism:

http://gmancasefile.blogspot.com.au/201 ... -fail.html

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was formed to ensure America’s freedom to travel. Instead, they have made air travel the most difficult means of mass transit in the United States, at the same time failing to make air travel any more secure.

TSA has never, (and I invite them to prove me wrong), foiled a terrorist plot or stopped an attack on an airliner. Ever. They crow about weapons found and insinuate that this means they stopped terrorism. They claim that they can’t comment due to “national security” implications. In fact, if they had foiled a plot, criminal charges would have to be filed. Ever hear of terrorism charges being filed because of something found during a TSA screening? No, because it’s never happened. Trust me, if TSA had ever foiled a terrorist plot, they would buy full-page ads in every newspaper in the United States to prove their importance and increase their budget.

Dd

[Ddrak]

Body scanners worthless?

[Embar Angylwrath]

http://rt.com/usa/news/tsa-us-girl-gun-869/

TSA threatens to lock down airport because they think a 4-year old girl who hugged grandma is a high security threat.

This agency HAS to go. Lets all agree we can start there for government psending reductions.

[Fallakin Kuvari]

There's this lovely story too: http://www.thedaily.com/page/2012/04/25 ... laint-1-3/

[Harlowe]

Good lord, honestly it's gotten so bad that I'm not even mildly surprised when I hear the latest TSA fail story.

Something Embar and I can agree on - TSA needs to go.

[Torakus]

Embar,

Actually that is a lot of bunk. Standard procedures are that if a passenger or non-passenger makes contact with somebody going through additional screening that this other person must also then go through additional screening. It had nothing to do with the TSA thinking that the little girl was somehow a terrorist or threat; they were following a standard procedure. I will also note that the CCTV recordings of the incident expose all of the lies and misinformation spread on that incident.

Fallakin,

I could not find any information on that particular incident but I highly doubt that any TSO started screaming and cursing at this passenger. If they had they would have been fired and I am certain I would have heard about that. Either way the TSO was following standard procedures in conducting the pat down for a passenger who is unable to pass through either the WTMD or the AIT. The modified pat downs for passengers of children of this age are very quick and not as intrusive as an adult standard pat down. The STSO who interrupted the procedure probably did so because the parents were making a fuss and unfortunately the supervisor was wrong and when it was noticed the procedure in place is to bring them back to the screening area to complete the screening. Senior leaders at airports get fired for allowing these standard procedures to be ignored. The top five officials at Fort Myers International got fired this week and 30+ screeners were placed on suspension until a decision is made to either fire or retain them. 15% of the entire TSA workforce at that airport fired for not following the standard procedures and improperly screening passengers.

I will just add that something most people miss is that it is rarely the TSA TSOs who are involved when loud arguments or altercations with passengers occur. Typically what you are seeing is the situation escalate after the LEOs become involved. TSOs do not have arrest powers and that is why there are local law enforcement officers in the airports.

Was there anyone left who was concerned about TSA not releasing any information on the AIT machines? If so would you like me to post links to the massive archive of FOIA released documents regarding them including the full un-redacted (except for names of assessors) safety surveys of every single backscatter and cabinet x-ray machine in use? It is all good reading and includes TSAs full responses to all the BS claims.

Tora

[Ddrak]

The airport checkpoints do not make flying any more secure than it was pre-9/11. It's all pure security theater. If it wasn't then the following would have been addressed immediately:

i) Liquids. Why is it not ok to carry a 20oz bottle, but 10 people can carry 2oz bottles? The whole liquid things is a joke and the TSA should just admit it.
ii) Laptops, PDAs and Phones. Laptop batteries can be trivially rigged to explode. Why does the TSA allow them? The only rational answer is because the bread and butter airline passenger would bitch up a storm.
iii) Fingernail clippers and other small things sharper than a baseball. You can trivially make a shiv from a sheet of paper and 2oz of epoxy. Why ban nail clippers?
iv) Backscatter X-Rays. These are much easier to fool than the old ones (sling pretty much anything side-on under your arm). Where is the value for money?
v) Queues. A terrorist in an airport would go for the massive queue the TSA created at checkpoints. It's an attack vector that never existed before and actually makes terrorism easier! Why does the TSA persist in making airports less safe?

Fundamentally, two things and only two have made significant impact to the safety of flying. Stronger doors on the cockpit and passengers knowing that they have to stand up to terrorists rather than ride it out. The money spent on the TSA should be removed and put into the proper investigative policing work that has captured *every* serious terror threat before and after 9/11.

Note that this isn't to say those employed by the TSA are bad, evil or deserve to lose their jobs. I'm positive Torakus (for one) is doing awesome at his defined position within the constraints placed on it. The issue is that the entire premise of the agency is flawed and only exists because it's not politically safe to accept that terrorism is and will always be a risk and the sooner people refuse to be terrorized the sooner the US stops losing the war on terror.

Dd

[Torakus]

The airport checkpoints do not make flying any more secure than it was pre-9/11. It's all pure security theater. If it wasn't then the following would have been addressed immediately:

i) Liquids. Why is it not ok to carry a 20oz bottle, but 10 people can carry 2oz bottles? The whole liquid things is a joke and the TSA should just admit it.
ii) Laptops, PDAs and Phones. Laptop batteries can be trivially rigged to explode. Why does the TSA allow them? The only rational answer is because the bread and butter airline passenger would bitch up a storm.
iii) Fingernail clippers and other small things sharper than a baseball. You can trivially make a shiv from a sheet of paper and 2oz of epoxy. Why ban nail clippers?
iv) Backscatter X-Rays. These are much easier to fool than the old ones (sling pretty much anything side-on under your arm). Where is the value for money?
v) Queues. A terrorist in an airport would go for the massive queue the TSA created at checkpoints. It's an attack vector that never existed before and actually makes terrorism easier! Why does the TSA persist in making airports less safe?

Fundamentally, two things and only two have made significant impact to the safety of flying. Stronger doors on the cockpit and passengers knowing that they have to stand up to terrorists rather than ride it out. The money spent on the TSA should be removed and put into the proper investigative policing work that has captured *every* serious terror threat before and after 9/11.

Note that this isn't to say those employed by the TSA are bad, evil or deserve to lose their jobs. I'm positive Torakus (for one) is doing awesome at his defined position within the constraints placed on it. The issue is that the entire premise of the agency is flawed and only exists because it's not politically safe to accept that terrorism is and will always be a risk and the sooner people refuse to be terrorized the sooner the US stops losing the war on terror.

Dd

Airports not being more secure: Prior to TSA federalizing the airports how many airplanes were hi-jacked? How many since? This argument is meaningless anyway since there is really no way to quantify "more secure than it was pre 9/11" except to judge how many people were killed in terrorist activity on domestic or international flights originating in the U.S. before TSA formed and after. Using that metric I think you can clearly see that any number above 0, which is the number since federalization of airport screening, would mean that your argument falls flat and it is indeed safer to fly now due to airport screening. Of course it is a correlation and we know what that means and doesn't.

Liquids - The ban on liquids did not happen at roll out because TSA just did not anticipate the threat. After the shoe bomber and underwear bomber attempts, DHS commissioned studies through agencies and research organizations with explosives expertise to determine the threat. I am not an expert in that particular area but the 3-1-1 rule arose because the most likely threat liquid combinations that would make an explosive did not pose a significant threat to the aircraft, crew or passengers when restricted to those levels. Sure it is not the 100% solution because multiple passengers working in concert could still exceed the limits, but it still mitigates the threat to a degree. Should we toss out every rule that doesn't fix 100% of the problem when it clearly doesn't create a significant problem?

Laptop PDAs batteries. While you can easily make them explode, they pose a trivial risk to both passengers, crew and the aircraft. Someone holding the device might be injured, but the explosion is not huge and generally isn't much of an explosion at, simply a nasty fire. Nail clippers are not banned and never have been. There may have been isolated incidents where a TSO made a mistake but http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/ ... items.shtm does not list it as a prohibited item. Take a look at what is actually prohibited, it isn't the simple things you think or hear parroted on the news by "journalists" who don't bother to check or even ask.

Backscatter: Wrong. The idea that the backscatter return image is confined to only reflections from your skin is wrong. Things hanging from your side are detected. The problem here is that, while I know the reason that the fellow made it through with his non-banned item in the side pocket he sewed into his shirt, I cannot tell you because it is considered Sensitive Security Information. I will simply say that the anomaly presented was not sufficient to require secondary screening.

Queue: TSA clearly recognizes the threat of an attack on a large queue of passengers in an airport. The screening operations at each airport have to monitor the screening times (an no I cannot tell you the standard time) and report if it goes over certain thresholds. To avoid the need to report they will generally shift personnel around to open more lanes at a checkpoint to bring the wait times down and clear the area faster. But the queue is also plays an important security role. If you think you are not being observed while you are in that line and your threat level being assessed by officers trained behavior detection officers you are kidding yourself. TSA cannot secure the entire airport, this is why there is a designated sterile area and that starts after you finish screening and stops when you leave the exit lane at your destination.

The Queue as a new attack vector: BS, don't believe everything you hear from "experts" on terrorism. All that happened is the vector moved from the gate / jetway waiting area to the lobby and since the population in the waiting areas around the jetways is considerably larger than the population at any checkpoint, the risk is significantly reduced.

Tora

[Ddrak]

There's a very good ways to quantify the contribution checkpoints have made: look at how many actual terror plots were stopped by them as compared to the number stopped by other methods. So far, it's zero at checkpoints and non-zero from passengers in the plane, terrorist stupidity or capture before the plan even comes to fruition (of which a bunch are awfully close to entrapment, but that's another story).

Of course, measuring "deaths" is pointless because killing people is not and has never been the goal of terrorism. Their goal is to wage asymmetric warfare and the occasional $10k plot keeping the multi-billion dollar-per-year TSA running around like scared children terrorizing the general population with dire warnings is the most cost-effective terrorism that has ever been achieved.

Liquids: "The TSA didn't anticipate the threat" is the exact problem with specific checks. There's far more specific threats than there is time or methods to check for them so the TSA is reduced to preventing the last successful penetration. The liquids one is particularly stupid given the sheer number of attack vectors to get arbitrary liquids through the gate. Send 200 terrorists with forged boarding passes (there's no correlation done at the checkpoint to prevent this) with 3oz of liquids and you can have a bomb big enough to blow a whole plane to shrapnel that can be pooled by a single terrorist before they even get aboard. Should you toss out a bloody annoying rule that has a trivial workaround? Of course!

Laptop batteries:



That's an unmodified battery. A little bit of work and you could easily punch a hole in the fuselage with that sort of explosion. Again, like the "liquid threat", given the compounding effect of multiple terrorists sharing after the checkpoint, the threat is real, known and renders any real objective of the checkpoints pretty much moot.

Knives: I stand corrected. Everything equivalent to what the 9/11 terrorists used barring the actual implement (box cutters) is just fine to bring on a plane now. The current checkpoints would therefore have NOT stopped 9/11.

Backscatter: I wasn't talking about what it *could* detect. I was talking about what you let through. Doesn't matter what the reason is, the point is you can take a metal case with arbitrary contents slung under your arm through the checkpoints. It's an obvious weakness and to assume terrorists don't have access to backscatter machines to trial whatever they like is just silly. The end result in the backscatter machines have holes the same as the old machines so the money spent is effectively wasted.

Queue: The queue is far more densely packed than any gate lounge. It's nothing to do with "screening times" and adding extra lanes doesn't decrease the number of people in the queue, just the waiting time for the individual. If the TSA was mitigating the risk then they'd have to report on queue size, not waiting time. Of course I know that you're attempting threat assessment while placing passengers in an uncomfortable situation of waiting in a densely packed area, and I'd contend that the stress you're putting on people makes the behavioral analysis read far more false positives than observing in the more relaxed settings of a gate or terminal lounge.

I'm absolutely saying your risk assessment on the queue is flawed and also saying the risk assessment is far more concerned about public complaints than it is about actual terrorism. I believe the checkpoints established under the TSA have shifted the risk around but done nothing substantial to the overall risk while significantly increasing the annoyance of flying. Any gains in security have been from other mechanisms.

Dd

[Torakus]

So far, it's zero at checkpoints and non-zero from passengers in the plane,

Are you sure? Are you telling me that you have access to the daily sitrep? I won't suggest you are talking out your ass, but you are talking about issues where you don't have and won't get all of the information. Can't say much more because it is SSI.

Of course, measuring "deaths" is pointless because killing people is not and has never been the goal of terrorism. Their goal is to wage asymmetric warfare and the occasional $10k plot keeping the multi-billion dollar-per-year TSA running around like scared children terrorizing the general population with dire warnings is the most cost-effective terrorism that has ever been achieved.

I would think the majority of passengers disagree. They are not terrorized to fly. In fact people feel downright safe while flying, so the fact that no successful attacks have happened since people starting being screened means the terror isn't working and the money spent is well spent.

Liquids: "The TSA didn't anticipate the threat" is the exact problem with specific checks. There's far more specific threats than there is time or methods to check for them so the TSA is reduced to preventing the last successful penetration. The liquids one is particularly stupid given the sheer number of attack vectors to get arbitrary liquids through the gate. Send 200 terrorists with forged boarding passes (there's no correlation done at the checkpoint to prevent this) with 3oz of liquids and you can have a bomb big enough to blow a whole plane to shrapnel that can be pooled by a single terrorist before they even get aboard. Should you toss out a bloody annoying rule that has a trivial workaround? Of course!

TSA cooperates with the air carriers and indeed the TDC (travel document check) catches forged boarding passes all of the time and they are referred to LE and are not permitted into the sterile area. So again you or your source of information don't quite have all the facts. I do agree that the 3-1-1 rule needs to go. We have the technology in place to scan liquids of any size for explosives, but I will let you in on a dirty little secret; the airports are making money off of TSA not letting them through, which forces the passengers to buy airport vendor's products.

Laptop batteries:

Like I said, that is a pretty small pop with a wicked hot little fire. But it would take a pretty well planned and executed attack to get multiple people on the plane with rigged batteries. The folks looking at the image of your laptop in the cabinet x-ray are not as dumb as most people think. They know what the guts of a typical laptop look like (in general) and I am pretty confident they would detect the modifications.

Backscatter: I wasn't talking about what it *could* detect. I was talking about what you let through. Doesn't matter what the reason is, the point is you can take a metal case with arbitrary contents slung under your arm through the checkpoints. It's an obvious weakness and to assume terrorists don't have access to backscatter machines to trial whatever they like is just silly. The end result in the backscatter machines have holes the same as the old machines so the money spent is effectively wasted.

Considering that the RAPISCAN machines are export controlled it is a pretty good assumption that no terrorists have them to run trials. I can't claim that backscatter is flawless, but it doesn't have the huge gaping security holes that you think and ATR is rolling out as we speak on them which eliminates the black background causing hard objects outside the body image from being missed.

Queue: The queue is far more densely packed than any gate lounge. It's nothing to do with "screening times" and adding extra lanes doesn't decrease the number of people in the queue, just the waiting time for the individual. If the TSA was mitigating the risk then they'd have to report on queue size, not waiting time. Of course I know that you're attempting threat assessment while placing passengers in an uncomfortable situation of waiting in a densely packed area, and I'd contend that the stress you're putting on people makes the behavioral analysis read far more false positives than observing in the more relaxed settings of a gate or terminal lounge.

??? I am not sure what airports you are flying in, but he checkpoint has an ebb and flood at larger category X airports. The one exception that I can think of is SFO which is not staffed by TSA, it is a private security company call CAS.

Tora

[Ddrak]

Are you sure? Are you telling me that you have access to the daily sitrep? I won't suggest you are talking out your ass, but you are talking about issues where you don't have and won't get all of the information. Can't say much more because it is SSI.

Yes. I'm 100% positive. The day the TSA catches a bona-fide terrorist they will have the PR field day of the century.

I would think the majority of passengers disagree. They are not terrorized to fly. In fact people feel downright safe while flying, so the fact that no successful attacks have happened since people starting being screened means the terror isn't working and the money spent is well spent.

I don't think they feel "safe" at all. You only have to see the looks that someone in a turban gets on a plane to know that terrorism is and remains at the front of people's minds, in a large part due to the government's insistence on justifying the trillions spent on a largely ineffective war on terror.

TSA cooperates with the air carriers and indeed the TDC (travel document check) catches forged boarding passes all of the time and they are referred to LE and are not permitted into the sterile area. So again you or your source of information don't quite have all the facts. I do agree that the 3-1-1 rule needs to go. We have the technology in place to scan liquids of any size for explosives, but I will let you in on a dirty little secret; the airports are making money off of TSA not letting them through, which forces the passengers to buy airport vendor's products.

I have no doubt there's lots of money to be made from the various bannings, which is why I am completely skeptical of all but the most obvious.

On the TDC, you'd have to be pretty stupid to make a boarding pass that wasn't perfect. Unless procedures have changed and the TSA is doing more than a visual comparison between boarding pass and passport then it's, uh, trivial to share a home-printed pass between as many people as you like with about ten minutes in effort in Photoshop to change the name and appropriate codes.

But it would take a pretty well planned and executed attack to get multiple people on the plane with rigged batteries.

I agree, but that's the precise threat model here. 9/11 was pretty well planned and executed with full knowledge of the security systems they were going through to defeat. It's why the checkpoints are largely useless against any well planned attack - there's so many gaps because you can't check every specific threat, which leaves it as primarily theater to justify the budget and not to actually improve safety.

I will say though that some things have impressed me - the TSA's continued persistence in random additional screening in the face of pressure to stop "screening grandmas" and the fact that the TSA does value the ability of their officers to pick up unusual behavior outside the screening area. Those both work against the unknown future attacks rather than the static screenings targetting known vectors which fail against novel attacks.

Considering that the RAPISCAN machines are export controlled it is a pretty good assumption that no terrorists have them to run trials. I can't claim that backscatter is flawless, but it doesn't have the huge gaping security holes that you think and ATR is rolling out as we speak on them which eliminates the black background causing hard objects outside the body image from being missed.

It's a complete fallacy to think hardware is unavailable to a determined and well-funded adversary. I hope you're not seriously suggesting that every single person involved in the RAPISCAN production is 100% secure, much less that every deployment of it around the globe is secure. It's not like the physics behind backscatter X-Rays is particularly "secret". In any case, the TSA provides a perfect dry run scenario anyway. Try stuff with random mules to see what gets picked and what doesn't. We're not talking lone idiots here, we're talking well funded and determined adversaries.

I am not sure what airports you are flying in, but he checkpoint has an ebb and flood at larger category X airports. The one exception that I can think of is SFO which is not staffed by TSA, it is a private security company call CAS.

Pittsburgh, LAX and Vegas mostly (from memory). Busy time of day the queue expanded to at least a thousand people waiting in a tightly packed zig-zag line. A suitcase or two of Semtex and nails would be just perfect in the middle of that.

Now, compare that with Singapore or Amsterdam where they screen at the gate lounge with a much shorter queue and much smaller secure area to actually be worried about...


Like I said, I think the TSA has an impossible role. The external political imperative is to stop 100% of threats, known and unknown. The internal political imperative is to continue to be funded in the wake of terrorists having much better targets running around in their home countries to bother too much about the US which means being as visible and in-your-face as possible. The moral imperative is to make the best use of taxpayer's money, which would largely put the TSA as invisible because the best work is unpredictable observation and not routine screening and more importantly would require the acknowledgement that it's impossible to be 100% secure. The three imperatives are incompatible.

Dd