OMFG please please please read the opinion. Then you would likely stop asking these questions.....I wonder if that means I can own a shoulder-fired stinger missle system, for protection. Or an M1-Abrams tank (wouldn't that be cool). If Scalia's position is that US citizens have an unqualified right to own any weapon, absent a compelling state interest to limit the right, then the burden of proof will always on the state if they want to limit, in any way, the right of a citizen to bear arms.
Obvioulsy, it would seem rather easy for the state to show a compelling interest in limiting the sale of stinger missles and tanks. I just tossed that out as a crazy circumstance. Neither are all that effective for self-protection (unles you sleep in the tank), and no one wants some chuckle-head to start popping stingers at the odd airliner.
But what about fully automatic weapons? I can see a use for those. If you find yourself on the receiving end of a home invasion, 9 rounds may not be enough. But 50 or 60 might, especially if you're scared and need to "spray to slay", becuase you can't aim accurately.
The majority opinion makes it perfectly clear that there already exists a compelling interest to ban certain types of weapons as Miller indicates. There is another part that I cannot locate at the moment which reiterates this point.We may as well consider at this point (for we will have
to consider eventually) what types of weapons Miller
permits. Read in isolation, Miller’s phrase “part of ordinary
military equipment” could mean that only those
weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a
startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that
the National Firearms Act’s restrictions on machineguns
(not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional,
machineguns being useful in warfare in 1939. We think
that Miller’s “ordinary military equipment” language must
be read in tandem with what comes after: “[O]rdinarily
when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were
expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves
and of the kind in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at
179. The traditional militia was formed from a pool of
men bringing arms “in common use at the time” for lawful
purposes like self-defense. “In the colonial and revolutionary
war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen
and weapons used in defense of person and home were one
and the same.” State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614
P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Neumann, Swords and
Blades of the American Revolution 6–15, 252–254 (1973)).
Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the Second
Amendment’s operative clause furthers the purpose announced
in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say
only that the Second Amendment does not protect those
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens
for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.
That accords with the historical understanding of the
scope of the right, see Part III, infra.25
